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Abstract 
 
This paper brings together concepts from the domains of disability studies, governmentality 
studies and Actor-Network Theory in order to develop a micro-level analysis of a scheme for 
the provision of personal assistance for disabled people, currently administered by the Sofia 
Municipality in Bulgaria. The workfare conditionality embedded in the scheme’s needs 
assessment procedure is highlighted and subjected to critique. The micro-level analysis is 
deployed on the background of wider, macro-level observations concerning the neoliberal 
mode of government and its relations to subjectivity and freedom. The conclusion suggests 
practical policy alternatives in line with the Independent Living philosophy and practice. 
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Introduction 
 
Drawing on the work of Michel Foucault, governmentality scholars (Barry et al., 1996) have 
argued that those present-day societies usually designated as ‘advanced liberal’ or 
‘neoliberal’ govern their subjects by inciting them to act in specific ways and holding them 
individually responsible for their own wellbeing (Lemke, 2002). Thus the incentives to work, 
study, care, consume or enjoy become the ultimate means of control. In an ‘advanced liberal’ 
society, one is governed not through restrictions, but through freedom (Rose, 1999). Rather 
than exploiting or suppressing pre-given subjective content (interests, needs, motivations, 
desires), contemporary ‘conduct of conduct’ (Foucault, 1982) creates or shapes the content 
of the self. This is the solution to the problem of government posed by the neoliberal 
delegitimation of state intervention in the market sphere, coupled with a wholesale 
marketization of all areas of life (of which numerous lucid examples can be found in Sandel, 
2012). 
 
The result is a subject ‘who may be more desirous of its own subjection and complicit in its 
subordination than any democratic subject could be said to be’ (Brown, 2006: 702). Indeed, 
it is much more difficult to resist subordination that comes from the ‘inside’, grounded in 
experiences of individual moral responsibility to study or work (against all structural odds), 
than one that is clearly identifiable as imposed from the ‘outside’. Accordingly, the 
techniques of government through shaping of subjectivity (‘subjectification’) draw their 
strength from the mere fact of remaining covered-up, black-boxed, ‘outside the formal 
control of the “public powers”’ (Rose, 1996: 58). What facilitates their black-boxing is that 
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they are not centralized but dispersed, embedded in diverse discourses, institutions, 
procedures and material artefacts. They work through complex ‘assemblages’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004; Latour, 2005) of humans and non-human entities. Accordingly, the tracing 
of the networks and processes that shape subjectivity is an effective tool for immanent 
critique by showing that the neoliberal society ‘does not live up to its self-portrayal [of taking 
subjectivity as it is] because it relies on molding subjects to an extent that remains 
unacknowledged by most neoliberal thinkers’ (Biebricher and Johnson, 2012: 211). 
 
In the domain of social policy, neoliberal rationality underpins a transition from welfare to 
workfare (Dean, 2007: 577-8). The attendant approach of ‘active’ labour market policies 
makes social support (benefits, care) for working age adults conditional on preparing for 
(e.g., through appropriate education or training) or engaging in paid employment. At present, 
social policy measures that render welfare recipients individually responsible for their 
wellbeing enjoy global acclaim: 
the notion that the state should play a reduced role in the provision of services and 
that individuals should take on greater responsibility for their own lives is, of course, 
the central tenet of the neo-liberal common sense which now underpins the 
programmes of most political parties the world over. (Ferguson, 2007: 394) 
 
The desires to be active, to work or to study are not reducible to functions of neoliberal 
assemblages – rather, neoliberal ‘activation’ shapes such desires to better serve the ends of 
responsibilization and welfare state retrenchment. Workfare programmes tend to disregard 
structural barriers to personal fulfilment, including labour market exploitation, impeded 
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social mobility, and lack of adequate social support. Underprivileged groups such as disabled 
people are particularly vulnerable to this increasingly hegemonic approach of workfare 
(Grover and Soldatic, 2013). It has been incorporated in different disability support 
mechanisms, including personal assistance schemes – for example, in their analysis of 
personal assistance in Scandinavian countries, Bonfils and Askheim (2014: 73) report that 
until 2009, ‘users in Denmark had to document a certain activity level to be qualified to get 
PA [personal assistance]’. This reflects a more general tendency to utilize personal assistance 
as a technique of governing: ‘the user must prove that the assistance is used in proper ways. 
Such conditions are internalized in the user as self-management, realizing that, if PA is not 
used as intended, the service will be withdrawn’ (Bonfils and Askheim, 2014: 74). 
 
The rest of this paper will focus on a Bulgarian case of governing through personal assistance. 
It will thus contribute to critical disability scholarship that follows Foucault in 
conceptualizing modern power as productive and dispersed rather than repressive and 
centralized in order to understand how practices of disability support govern people 
(Tremain, 2005). The analysis will look at an assemblage of activities and material artefacts 
(documents) that constitute an assessment procedure designed to establish eligibility and 
need for personal assistance of people with different impairments (physical, sensory, mental). 
It will be argued that disability assessment tools and practices do not only measure people’s 
needs, but also contribute to the government of individuals by shaping their self-
understanding, motivation and conduct. To this end, the analysis will attend critically to the 
effects of the disability assessment on the subjectivity of those undergoing it. Of particular 
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concern will be the moral aspects of this subjectification. The conclusion will suggest 
practical policy alternatives. 
 
Disability policy in Bulgaria and the personal assistance scheme of the Sofia 
Municipality 
 
Bulgaria is a former state socialist country located in Southeastern Europe. After the fall of 
the socialist regime in 1989, Bulgaria experienced a ‘transition’ from one-party rule to liberal 
democracy and from centrally planned to free-market economy; along this way, on 1 January 
2007 the country become a member of the European Union. Many of the economic, social, 
political and cultural transformations in the aftermath of 1989 had a neoliberal flavour and 
followed the pattern of Eastern European ‘shock therapy’ (Murrell, 1993), including 
deregulation, privatization of public assets, liberalization of foreign trade, restrictive fiscal 
policies, and welfare state retrenchment. Within this general context, the Bulgarian disability 
policy of the past two and a half decades has been moulded by the twin forces of the country’s 
state socialist legacy and postsocialist neoliberalization (Mladenov, 2015a). State socialism 
has bequeathed paternalism, medicalization of service provision and segregation of disabled 
people in residential institutions (Mladenov, 2011, 2015a, 2015b). On its behalf, postsocialist 
neoliberalization has conditioned low levels of funding for assistive technology and housing 
adaptations, cuts to disability benefits, decentralization of service provision (leading to 
unsustainability and unequal geographical distribution of services), weak monitoring, control 
and enforcement of disability regulations, and the gradual incorporation within disability 
policy of workfare conditionality (for an extended discussion see Mladenov, 2015b). 
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Workfare has affected disabled Bulgarians in different ways. An example of its indirect 
impact is provided by the national programme ‘Welfare to Work’ that was launched by the 
Bulgarian government in 2002 (CIL, 2009a: 5) with the aim to take unemployed people off 
benefits and bring them back to work. A component of this programme mandated to long-
term unemployed to work as personal assistants under the threat of benefit sanctions. As a 
result, assistance users were faced with ‘demoralised assistants whose selection was beyond 
disabled people’s control’ (Mladenov, 2015b: 450). The focus of this paper is on a case of 
workfare policy that has affected disabled Bulgarian directly by being embedded in a scheme 
for the provision of personal assistance titled ‘Assistants for Independent Living’ (AIL) that 
has been implemented by the Sofia Municipality since 2007.1 
 
The first round of applications took place at the end of 2007, with subsequent rounds held at 
the end of each calendar year. Although it is not a ‘direct payments’ scheme – no funds are 
transferred to the user and the assistants can only be employed by the service provider – the 
user nevertheless enjoys considerable liberty in choosing his/her assistants (currently, up to 
five per user), determining their tasks and times of working (currently, up to 300 hours per 
month), evaluating their work and dismissing them, if deemed necessary. These elements 
                                               
1 The current version of the AIL Ordinance and its Annexes are available online at 
http://dsd.sofia.bg/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=76&Itemid=35 
(accessed 4 September 2015). 
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match the personal assistance model promoted by Independent Living advocates such as 
Ratzka (2004: 3), where: 
users are free to choose their preferred degree of personal control over service 
delivery according to their needs, capabilities, current life circumstances, preferences 
and aspirations. Their range of options includes the right to custom-design their own 
services, which requires that the user decides who is to work, with which tasks, at 
which times, where and how. 
 
The genealogy of the AIL scheme is also related to the Independent Living philosophy and 
practice (DeJong, 1979; Morris, 2004) and, particularly, to Ratzka’s model (for a discussion 
and critical evaluation see Mladenov, 2012). In its original draft version, the AIL Ordinance 
was proposed by the Bulgarian disabled people’s organization Center for Independent Living 
– Sofia (http://cil.bg) on the basis of the organization’s previous experience with 
administering personal assistance for disabled people under a foreign-funded project 
(Dakova, 2004) and following the guidelines provided by Ratzka, whose work the 
organization translated into Bulgarian and published as a separate booklet in 2005 (available 
online at: www.cil.bg/userfiles/library/otdelni/sweden_2005.pdf). After years of advocacy, 
the AIL Ordinance was adopted by the Municipal Council on 26 July 2007. Since then, the 
Sofia Municipality has been promoting the AIL scheme as ‘unique’ in the sense that there is 
no other service in Bulgaria that provides disabled people with such a degree of control over 
their own assistance, and, consequently, with the chance ‘to lead an active social life and feel 
full citizens’ (Sofia Municipality, 2013: n.p.). 
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Nevertheless, over the years of its existence the AIL scheme has been plagued by a number 
of problems. To begin with, personal assistance under the scheme is available to the residents 
of the Sofia Municipality only, which contributes to the uneven geographical distribution of 
disability services in Bulgaria. In reaction to this, for a number of years now the Center for 
Independent Living – Sofia has been advocating for the adoption of a Law on Personal 
Assistance that would make the service available on a national level. Further, the scheme is 
funded by the municipal budget and administered by municipal service providers, which 
considerably limits the available resources. Consequently, users are required to reapply each 
year, competing for funding with all other applicants on the basis of a controversial ranking 
system (discussed in detail below). At that, the demand for the service clearly exceeds its 
supply (see Sofia Municipality, 2015). Those who apply but do not qualify for assistance 
under the AIL scheme are forced to recourse to more limiting assistance options, informal 
care, and/or segregated alternatives such as daycare or long-term residential care (see 
Panayotova, 2014: 18-19 and 25-26). The sustainability of the scheme is also an issue, 
considering that the amount allocated from the municipal budget to be spent on AIL is revised 
yearly by the Municipal Council on the basis of needs forecasts and the available resources. 
 
These and other related issues precipitated a number of changes in the way the needs 
assessment and resource allocation were conducted. Since 2007, the scheme underwent 
several revisions. The last major change was introduced in 2012, when the scheme was 
formally split in two – one for children aged 5 to 18 years, and one for working age adults. 
The two components remained codified by the AIL Ordinance. Most important for the 
purposes of the present analysis, since 2012 the scheme has incorporated a significant 
 9 
emphasis on ‘social activity’ (sotsialna aktivnost), defined in the AIL Ordinance (Additional 
Provisions) through a focus on paid work and formal education: 
The social activity of the user includes his [sic] labour activity under employment, 
business and equivalent contractual relationships (contracts for services, freelancers, 
sole traders, etc.), educational activity for obtaining an educational degree (primary, 
secondary, tertiary – vocational Bachelor, Bachelor, Master, doctoral degree) or 
vocational qualification in accordance with the Law on Vocational Education and 
Training, and attending kindergarten. 
 
The emphasis on ‘social activity’ changed the eligibility criteria. At present, the eligibility of 
the adult applicants is effectively conditional on their engagement in paid employment and/or 
formal education, and the eligibility of children – on their already being in formal education. 
Such workfare conditionality is not explicitly stated in the AIL Ordinance. Rather, it is 
embedded in the needs assessment procedure, thus exercising a considerable albeit implicit 
productivist pressure on the applicants. As already suggested in the introduction, such 
pressure is characteristic of neoliberal social policy regimes where ‘[c]itizens receiving 
welfare are forced to earn their social entitlements through participation in the labour market’ 
(Soldatic and Chapman, 2010: 141; the impact of productivism on disabled people is 
discussed extensively in Mladenov, 2015a). 
 
Workfare responsibilization has victimizing and disciplining effects. It tends to blame 
individuals for failings of structural origins, and it produces a disciplined workforce by 
imposing productivist moral standards. Thus workfare is a governmental technique that 
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shapes subjects by making them internalize a specific productivist morality. The critics of 
neoliberalism have regarded this as ‘the economy’s colonization of the Freudian superego’ 
(Lazzarato, 2012: 95), whereby an external injunction for labour market productivity is 
transformed into an internal demand. Workfare responsibilization is especially damaging 
when applied to disabled people who encounter additional structural barriers in their attempts 
to be productive in the open labour market. Consider the employment of disabled Bulgarians 
of working age – according to the latest available data from the National Statistical Institute, 
their employment rate in 2011 was 22.5%, while the employment rate of non-disabled people 
was 59.1% (Panayotova, 2014: 7). Furthermore, drawing on data provided by Eurostat, 
Panayotova (2014: 5) has reported that in 2012, the employment rate of Bulgarians with 
‘severe disability’ (who comprise the target group of the AIL scheme) was merely 12.4%. 
 
In this regard, it is important to note that the disability movement and disability scholars have 
resisted and criticized workfare policies and practices. For example, according to the ‘UK 
Disabled People’s Manifesto: Reclaiming our Futures’, welfare support ‘must not be 
restricted or limited to those that are viewed as “deserving” or productive’ (Inclusion London, 
2013: 7). The Independent Living model for the provision of personal assistance, referred to 
above, explicitly states that eligibility should be granted regardless of the user’s ‘employment 
or insurance situation’ (Ratzka, 2004: 3). The UK organization Disabled People Against Cuts 
(DPAC, http://dpac.uk.net) actively supports campaigns against workfare. 
 
In the case of the AIL scheme after its 2012 revision, workfare conditionality and the 
attendant responsibilization mechanism have been covered up or black-boxed through their 
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dispersal in the assemblage of the scheme’s needs assessment procedure. To unpack this 
assemblage will be the main aim of the next section. 
 
The needs assessment procedure 
 
The AIL scheme elaborates its own needs assessment procedure that is intended to measure 
the eligibility of the applicants for participating in the scheme and the degree of their need 
for personal assistance. The procedure is complex and involves a considerable amount of 
documentation. The AIL Ordinance is accompanied by 30 annexes – 16 for adult applicants 
and 14 for children. These annexes are forms to be filled in by the applicants, their relatives, 
prospective assistants, social workers (assessors) and other decision-makers. In addition, a 
number of evidential documentation is also required from each applicant in support of his/her 
application – proof of identity, proof of address, disability certificate, proof of employment 
and/or enrolment in formal education (if any), as well as other documents evidencing ‘social 
activity’. 
 
It will be analytically useful to regard the forms included in the AIL needs assessment 
procedure as mediators that not only carry but also co-construct or translate meaning 
between the elements that they connect such as people (disabled applicants, personal 
assistants, social workers, decision makers), other forms, funding and assistance. The 
concepts of ‘mediators’ and ‘translation’ are borrowed from Actor-Network Theory (Latour, 
2005) in order to highlight the crucial role of the non-human entities in the constitution of 
human meanings. Latour (2005: 39) distinguishes ‘mediators’ from ‘intermediaries’ – the 
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latter are entities that transport meaning without transforming it, while the former transport 
meaning by transforming, co-constructing or translating it. To regard an entity as an 
intermediary is to black-box the work of translation, whereas to regard it as a mediator is to 
unpack translation by illuminating and exploring the entity’s role in producing or shaping of 
meaning. 
 
The concepts of ‘mediators’ and ‘translation’ make traceable the diverse and locally 
dispersed ways in which internal, subjective content (needs, affects, desires, aspirations, 
expectations, motivations) is externally or objectively produced, maintained and/or modified. 
The micro-level sociological investigations informed by these concepts could effectively 
complement macro-level critiques of contemporary regimes of power that govern individuals 
by shaping their subjectivity. In the domain of social policy, the concepts of ‘mediators’ and 
‘translation’ enable the concrete exploration of the mechanisms for embedding specific moral 
imperatives into pivotal practices for the administration of social support such as needs 
assessment procedures. Such practices are conventionally regarded as neutral – in other 
words, they get black-boxed as mere intermediaries. Yet in a social policy context that 
promotes workfare strategies for addressing welfare issues, they tend to articulate joblessness 
as a ‘private moral failure’ (Soldatic and Chapman, 2010: 142). The AIL scheme is an 
instance of such an articulation, where the multiplication of needs assessment documentation 
significantly augments the work of mediation and translation, thus making it a fertile ground 
for exploring the social constitution of individual morality (on the micro level) and the 
attendant mechanisms of governing individuals through freedom (on the macro level). 
Below, I will focus on the needs assessment of adult applicants. There, the productivist 
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pressure is more pronounced than in the case of children, given that adults are subjected to 
injunctions to work and study, whereas children are only pressurised to study. 
 
Four stages of translation 
 
The choice of annexes to be analysed here is informed by their significance for the needs 
assessment procedure – accordingly, the analysis will focus on those documents that do most 
of the work of translating the applicants’ needs into assistance hours. For the purposes of the 
present analysis, four stages will be distinguished in this work of translation: 
 the applicant’s needs are translated into degrees of ability and activity (Annex 1.7); 
 the degrees of ability and activity are translated into points (Annex 1.12); 
 the points are translated into ranking (Annexes 1.13 and 1.14); 
 and the points of those who are successful in the ranking are translated into assistance 
hours (Annex 1.15). 
 
This elaborate work of translation involves a number of actors – the applicant, his/her 
assistant(s), the two social workers conducting the assessment, and the decision-makers that 
comprise the Commission under Art. 15 of the AIL Ordinance. It should be noted that this 
assemblage is not horizontally but hierarchically structured, with the Commission at the top. 
In particular, the latter is empowered to make final admission decisions, as well as final 
decisions on the amount of assistance hours to be provided to the individual users who have 
been admitted (Art. 6 of the AIL Ordinance). The members of the Commission include 
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municipal councilors, physicians and other experts. The Commission functions as a focal 
point, a centre of attraction that gathers the filled-in forms and supporting documents 
(bottom-up movement) and sanctions the distribution of resources (top-down movement). 
Notwithstanding this centralization and hierarchization though, the effects of power and 
subjectification are also – and significantly – distributed within the assemblage that 
constitutes the AIL needs assessment procedure. This will become clear by looking closely 
at each of the four stages of translation that are at work in the procedure. 
 
(1) The applicant’s needs are translated into degrees of ability and activity (Annex 1.7) 
 
The items included in Annex 1.7 – the ‘Needs assessment questionnaire’ – request 
information about the applicant’s health condition, family situation, abilities and activities. 
The first section of the annex inquires about the health condition of the applicant, reflecting 
the medicalization of the eligibility criteria and, more broadly, the hegemony of the ‘medical 
model’ of disability in Bulgarian disability policy (Mladenov, 2011) – in order to be eligible 
for using the AIL scheme, adults need to be certified (prior to applying for the scheme) with 
‘90 % and over 90 % permanently decreased ability to work with assigned assistance, [and 
be in possession of] a valid TEMC [Territorial Expert Medical Commission] or NEMC 
[National Expert Medical Commission] decision’ (Art. 4 of the AIL Ordinance). This 
medical-productivist translation of disability into a number is a function of the way in which 
the Bulgarian state frames disability for welfare purposes in general – as a percentage of 
‘decreased ability to work’ (namalena rabotosposobnost) derived from a medical diagnosis 
and/or medically identified functional limitation established by a Territorial/National Expert 
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Medical Commission (TEMC/NEMC) through a procedure conducted by medical 
professionals, in a medical setting, using medical criteria (Mladenov, 2011). The ‘expert 
decision’ issued by TEMC/NEMC in the form of a disability certificate functions on a meta-
level, as a meta-decision – it is a decision that opens up the possibility for the individual to 
be subjected to other decisions. In other words, it is the standard basis for getting access to 
all disability-related welfare structures and processes in the country. This excessive 
medicalization of disability is problematic in itself (Mladenov, 2011), but it is particularly 
troubling with regard to assessing eligibility for personal assistance because many assistance 
needs are lost in this translation of one’s disability into a medical-productivist number (i.e., 
percentage of ‘decreased ability to work’). 
 
The presupposition informing the other sections of Annex 1.7 will be explored in the next 
part of this text, when looking at the translation of the degrees of ability and activity into 
points. Here, I would like to make some preliminary comments on sections III (‘Physical 
condition’) and IV (‘Psycho-emotional and sensory condition’) of Annex 1.7 that are 
dedicated to assessing the applicant’s abilities. The items included in these two sections are 
descriptions of activities that are assessed on a scale of three degrees of ability: full ability – 
partial ability – inability (can do… – partially can do… – cannot do…), for example: ‘1. 
Locomotive activity: can move alone – partly can move alone – cannot move alone’. The 
translation of the applicant’s needs into degrees of ability effected by this formulation relies 
on a crude and decontextualized understanding of ‘ability’. It is based on a binary model, 
where the organizing dichotomy is ‘presence vs. absence’ – an ability is either fully present, 
partially present or fully absent. This tripartite distinction is crude in the sense that it does 
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not allow the identification of other degrees of ability or of any dynamics in ability’s 
presence/absence – thus, for example, fluctuating conditions, including fatigue and pain, are 
left out of the equation. The insertion of a middle term – ‘partial presence’ – does little to 
expand or deconstruct the binary. Rather, the middle term reinforces its inherent logic, 
according to which one’s abilities are defined with respect to an imagined fully autonomous 
state of complete self-sufficiency. The items in sections III and IV follow the formula ‘Can / 
partially can / cannot do X alone’ – it is assumed that one is properly able when one can do 
something on one’s own. Thus it is individual agency rather than social-material structure 
that confers ontological status to an ability. In other words, an ability is real (full, present) 
only as far as it issues from an isolated agent, rather than being maintained by an en-abling 
social-material structure.2 This liberal-individualist rendering of agency and, by extension, 
ability underpins the next stage of translation as well. 
 
(2) The degrees of ability and activity are translated into points (Annex 1.12) 
 
At this stage of translation, the inputs solicited by the ‘Needs assessment questionnaire’ 
(Annex 1.7) are translated into points by Annex 1.12. Thus each applicant is assigned points 
                                               
2 Yet even the capacity for autonomous decision-making, which is usually regarded as a 
purely cognitive process, requires enabling environments, as the relational autonomy 
theorists have argued (Mackenzie, 2008). The corollaries of the relational or distributed 
understanding of human being for personal assistance have been explored in Mladenov 
(2012). 
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that are meant to designate his/her level of ‘ability’ and ‘activity’. The resultant number will 
then be used to rank the applicant in the next stage of translation. The maximum amount of 
points that an applicant can get in each of the sections reflects the significance attributed to 
the section for the purposes of the needs assessment. Therefore, by looking at the distribution 
of the maximum points among the sections, it is possible to elicit the assumptions about social 
support that are embedded in the needs assessment procedure.  
 
Echoing Annex 1.7, Annex 1.12 contains two sections that focus on the applicant’s ‘abilities’ 
and two sections that cover the applicant’s employment, education and other ‘activities’. The 
maximum overall number of points that the applicant can get for his/her perceived lack of 
abilities is 47, while the maximum overall number of points in the section on ‘social activity’ 
is 80, where up to 40 points are assigned for being in full-time employment and another 40 
points – for being a full-time student at the time of application. If we add to this the maximum 
of 20 points assigned additionally for ‘other activities for active social inclusion’, including 
activities for improving one’s physical and mental health, participation in artistic and sports 
events and competitions, and voluntary work, it turns out that the share of the ‘activity’ points 
in the overall maximum number of points (157) is 64 % (100 points), while the share of the 
‘ability’ points is 30 % (47 points), with up to 10 additional points assigned in case the 
applicant lives with his/her minor(s). 
 
This simple arithmetic shows that the translation of the degrees of ability and activity into 
points mediated by Annex 1.12 renders current engagement in employment and education 
activities the dominant consideration for granting access to personal assistance. The applicant 
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has to be in some kind of paid employment or formal education in order to have a chance to 
compete for funding for personal assistance under the scheme, given the weight of these two 
‘activity’ categories relative to all other categories, including the ‘ability’ categories. Thus 
Annex 1.12 contains implicit workfare conditionality. Through the mediation of this 
document, the scheme effectively enforces ‘social inclusion’ and ‘active living’ by 
demanding engagement in paid employment and formal education. This generates a paradox 
or a contradiction, because in that way the provision of assistance is made conditional on the 
applicant’s ability to cope without assistance – note that the applicant is denied access to the 
service if s/he is using similar services at the time of application (Art. 4 of the AIL 
Ordinance). 
 
Moreover, the conditionality implied in the second stage of translation and embedded in 
Annex 1.12 makes the needs assessment to contradict the aim of the scheme, which is to 
‘compensate the deficit of people with permanent disabilities and difficulties in their active 
social inclusion and in everyday care’ (Art. 2 of the AIL Ordinance). This internal 
contradiction stems from the attempt to combine a welfare policy of providing social support 
(in order to ‘compensate the deficit’ of impairment) with a workfare policy of holding people 
individually responsible for their own support. From a macro-level perspective, this 
contradiction has structural origins – capitalism needs the welfare state in order to reproduce 
and discipline its workforce, but also in order to legitimize itself by mitigating the 
consequences of its mode of production, e.g., intensification of work, industrial incidents, 
inequality, environmental degradation, and so forth. With neoliberalism, the former task 
takes precedence over the latter: 
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The fear is that social security measures starve enterprises of labour, meaning that 
those who are willing to work are more expensive to employ, and that in the longer-
term labour will become ill-disciplined and may even raise future generations with 
similar negative attitudes towards paid work. However, not to provide social security 
support for workless people is equally problematic because not to do so has the 
potential, as analysts in the 1970s argued, to erode the legitimacy of capitalism. Such 
dilemmas and tensions are arguably exacerbated by neoliberalism as an accumulation 
regime, for although it still has the longer-term strategic needs of social reproduction 
it is framed, as we have seen, by the disdain for state intervention because of its 
potential to stifle the efficiency of the free market. (Grover and Soldatic, 2013: 225) 
 
As already pointed put, the neoliberal solution to the problem of how to intervene without 
intervening – a problem emerging from the classical liberal political rationality that frames 
people as autonomous, self-driven entities, and freedom as non-interference – is to ‘govern 
at a distance’ (Rose, 1996), to incite rather than impede action, and to shape rather than 
repress subjectivity. Accordingly, welfare is transformed into workfare. In the case of AIL, 
the solution to the problem of how to support without supporting is to implicitly make 
assistance conditional on self-assistance, i.e., on the applicant’s ability to cope on his/her 
own. The needs assessment procedure structures the possibilities for action of the applicants 
so that they make use of their freedom by engaging in paid employment and formal 
education. This workfare conditionality is not explicitly stated – on the contrary, the AIL 
Ordinance presents the scheme as enabling unqualified freedom or ‘independent living’. 
Conditionality is embedded in the needs assessment procedure by orchestrating the 
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translation of needs into assistance hours according to a workfare logic. As a result, disabled 
people find themselves responsibilized into pursuing paid employment and formal education, 
notwithstanding the structural barriers they encounter, including the lack of personal 
assistance. On the contrary – being responsible in the ways prescribed by the procedure is 
elevated to a major condition for getting assistance. 
 
(3) The points are translated into ranking (Annexes 1.13 and 1.14) 
 
At this stage of translation, the two social workers conducting the assessment submit to the 
Commission under Art. 15 a ‘Proposal for ranking of the applicant’ (Annex 1.13). On the 
basis of this proposal, the Commission decides on the final number of points and the 
assistance hours the applicant will get (Annex 1.14). Only those applicants who receive 
enough points in order to rank above a certain level determined by the locally available funds 
receive funding for personal assistance (Art. 17 of the AIL Ordinance) – the rest are included 
in a waiting list. Thus through the mediation of ranking, applicants find themselves in 
competition for funding with all other applicants – the more points one gets, the higher one’s 
position in the overall ranking and the bigger one’s chances of getting funding for personal 
assistance. The applicants’ ‘assets’ are comprised of their lack of abilities and their registered 
level of ‘activity’, meaning above all their involvement in paid employment and formal 
education. 
 
The introduction of the principle of competition at this stage of translation is a case of a 
market-based solution to a welfare austerity created by the limitations imposed by the 
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municipality on the AIL budget. The attendant incentive to maximize one’s capacity to 
compete with others – even when it comes to getting access to social assistance – is yet 
another technique of neoliberal government: ‘the generic disposition induced by 
neoliberalism is an organizing principle of the self, of the self’s relation to the self, and of its 
relation to others, articulated towards the maximisation of the self in a world perceived in 
terms of competition’ (Hilgers, 2013: 83). The conjunction of the techniques of 
responsibilization and competition creates a self-perpetuating, self-feeding cycle of 
subjectification – the applicant seeks to maximize his/her productive activity so that s/he 
could more effectively compete with others for funding, a substantial amount of which will 
be targeted at maximizing the applicant’s productive activity, as will become clear in the 
analysis of the next stage of translation. An ‘entrepreneurial self’ (Peters, 2001) is summoned 
to secure access to assistance that will feed into its entrepreneurial capacity. In a circular 
movement characteristic of the regimes that govern through freedom, the AIL scheme 
produces subjects fit for the specific type of assistance that it provides.3 At that, the pressure 
to compete with other people in need of personal assistance ‘crowds out’ (Sandel, 2012) the 
value of solidarity and erodes the possibility for collective action that are among the pillars 
the Independent Living philosophy and practice (Mladenov, 2012). 
 
Furthermore, the implicit distinction between the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ 
embedded in the ranking system is imposed on top of a prior, meta-level distinction between 
                                               
3 More than any other regime of government, neoliberalism works as ‘a political project that 
endeavors to create a social reality that it suggests already exists’ (Lemke, 2002: 60). 
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the ‘deserving’ and the ‘undeserving’ brought about by the medical expert assessment, as 
expressed in the TEMC/NEMC decision discussed above. At this stage of translation, 
disabled people are effectively re-classified and a new group of ‘truly disabled’ – from the 
perspective of the AIL scheme – is circumscribed. This operation repeats, at a smaller scale, 
a process of reclassification that is currently underway in OECD countries such as the UK. 
The process aims to restrict the access to the category of ‘disability’ and associated social 
benefits. It is part of the effort to reduce public spending in times of austerity and it has been 
associated with the neoliberal turn in social policy, where ‘the relief of the financial needs of 
disabled people are being subverted to productivist concerns with labour flexibility, growth 
in part-time, casualised labour markets and low wages related to international economic 
competition’ (Grover and Soldatic, 2013: 228). Disabled Bulgarians in need of personal 
assistance have opposed the re-classifying operation of the AIL scheme, interpreting it as a 
case of disability-based discrimination. In 2012, petitions signed by more than 40 users of 
the scheme were submitted to the Bulgarian Commission for Protection against 
Discrimination and to the Ombudsman of the Republic of Bulgaria, stating that the AIL 
Ordinance contains discriminatory texts that bring about unfavourable treatment of some 
people with disabilities in comparison to others (http://cil.bg/Новини/190.html). So far, these 
criticisms have remained ineffective. 
 
(4) The points of those who are successful in the ranking are translated into assistance 
hours (Annex 1.15) 
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The translation of the degrees of ability and activity into assistance hours is mediated by 
Annex 1.15. Notwithstanding the availability of this form, the mechanism of making the final 
decision on the precise number of assistance hours to be granted to the successful applicant 
remains black-boxed. First, each degree of ability is assigned an upper limit rather than a 
specific amount of assistance hours, for example: ‘Partially can prepare food alone – up to 
15 hours’. Thus the way in which the members of the Commission under Art. 15 decide 
exactly how many hours (up to the prescribed limit) to fund in each particular case remains 
a mystery for the outsiders. Second, the rationale for associating specific degrees of ability 
with specific upper limits of assistance hours is nowhere made explicit. The mechanism of 
this standardization is black-boxed as well. Third, only selected ‘physical’ (in)abilities get 
translated into assistance hours through Annex 1.15, while ‘psycho-emotional and sensory’ 
(in)abilities are inexplicably lost at this stage of translation, although they have contributed 
to the ranking of the applicant (which means that they have been regarded as signifying need). 
This loss undermines the communicative aspects of assistance – the latter gets reduced to 
help with locomotion or manual tasks that excludes support with perception, expression or 
understanding. The consequence is an implicit restriction of the opportunities for independent 
living of people with sensory, intellectual or psycho-social impairments. Most important, the 
black-boxing of the mechanisms underpinning the fourth stage of translation enhances the 
power asymmetry between those who apply for assistance and those who make admissions 
decisions. Thus it sustains and reinforces the traditional hierarchy of disability-related service 
provision (Morris, 2004). 
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This critique applies not only to the fourth stage of translation, but also to the needs 
assessment procedure as a whole. In itself, the multiplication of the stages of translation and 
their corresponding mediators has the effect of disempowering the applicant – an ironic 
corollary, considering that the scheme is meant to enable disabled people to lead 
‘independent and active lives’. The irony is further intensified by the fact that the scheme has 
originally been devised by following the Independent Living philosophy and practice 
(Morris, 2004; Ratzka, 2004). Yet in the model for the provision of personal assistance 
described by Ratzka (2004), the translation of the applicant’s needs into assistance hours 
happens on the spot, in the initial contact between the individual and his/her assessors. More 
precisely, needs are expressed in assistance hours from the outset: ‘The need of personal 
assistance is expressed in the average number of assistance hours per month that a person 
needs and not in terms of one of several need categories.’ (Ratzka, 2004: 5) This puts the 
applicants in a much better position to negotiate the hours in a regime of dialogue with their 
assessors. Thus the model described by Ratzka presupposes a single stage of translation. By 
multiplying the stage of translation and their corresponding mediators, the scheme of the 
Sofia Municipality turns the needs assessment process into a ‘machine’ (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 2004) for the production of compliant subjects – ‘objects and targets of a power that 
disciplines them in order to maximise production’ (Hilgers, 2013: 83). 
 
The last point is supported by an analysis of the distribution of hours among ability and 
activity categories (see Table 1 that presents the distribution of assistance hours by category 
as codified in Annex 1.15). Overall, the biggest share of hours is provided for each of the 
three entries comprising the ‘Social activity’ category – paid work (16.7 %), formal education 
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(16.7 %), and ‘other activities’ (16.7 %). Thus the fourth stage of translation implicitly 
reinforces the already discussed logic of responsibilization in the context of workfare 
conditionality. 
 
[‘Table 1: Distribution of assistance hours in Annex 1.15’ – given at the end of the paper] 
 
Concluding remarks 
 
There are practical as well as methodological corollaries to be drawn from the analysis of the 
AIL scheme presented in this paper. On the practical level, the analysis suggests that the AIL 
scheme, as it is presently codified in the AIL Ordinance and provided by the Sofia 
Municipality, requires an overhaul. There are many problematic elements – e.g., availability 
is limited to local residents, funding is restricted and unsustainable, users are forced to 
reapply each year, demand exceeds supply (for a comprehensive overview of these and other 
problems with the scheme see CIL, 2009b). This analysis focused on the needs assessment 
procedure as a key element in need of revision. The procedure should be simplified, reducing 
the mediators and the stages of translation involved, and redistributing decision-making 
power from the service provider towards the service users. Most important, eligibility should 
be decoupled from workfare conditionality. In addition, applicants should not be forced to 
compete with each other for social support – instead, funding should be made available to 
everyone in need of assistance. These suggestions support the demands for changes voiced 
by the Center for Independent Living – Sofia (http://cil.bg/Новини/190.html). In 2009, the 
Center produced a comprehensive assessment of the AIL scheme (the resultant report is 
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available online in Bulgarian – CIL, 2009b) that included interviews with users of the 
scheme. One of the key issues raised by the users was the heavily bureaucratized, non-
transparent and resource-led (rather than user-centred) needs assessment process (CIL, 
2009b: 11-14). Since then, the scheme has changed, but not for the better. 
 
In a longer-term perspective, the inequality generated by the sheer lack and/or the uneven 
geographical distribution of personal assistance for disabled people in Bulgaria (Mladenov, 
2015b) will only be overcome by adopting a Law on Personal Assistance that will take into 
account the lessons learned from the AIL scheme and will follow the guidelines of the 
Independent Living philosophy and practice (Morris, 2004; Ratzka, 2004). As has been 
argued elsewhere (Mladenov, 2012), only a strong disabled people’s movement, 
underpinning a nationwide network of user-led and user-controlled Centres for Independent 
Living that provide self-help, peer-support, advocacy and watchdog activities, could 
guarantee the proper development and enforcement of such a policy. Such a network 
represents the collective dimension of personal assistance that is often overlooked in the 
liberal-individualist promotion of consumerism in disability policy, but without which 
individual empowerment is unsustainable – not to say impossible – because it lacks socio-
political grounds (Mladenov, 2012). The proposed legislation would also enable the country 
to comply with Article 19 of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, 
ratified by Bulgaria in 2012. 
 
As far as methodology is concerned, the present analysis supports the view espoused by 
governmentality scholars that macro-level critique of contemporary power is in need of 
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micro-level investigations of the constitution of subjectivity (Lemke, 2002). Applied to the 
domain of disability policy, this means to regard workfare conditionality, responsibilization, 
and competition for public support as techniques for governing people by shaping their 
subjectivity. As argued by Bonfils and Askheim (2014), to represent personal assistance 
schemes as unequivocally liberating is to cover up their disciplining effects. In this paper, I 
argued that, against its promise to free welfare recipients for ‘independent and active living’ 
by undoing the paternalistic grip of top-down care, the AIL scheme ‘smuggles’ back 
unfreedom through implicit and dispersed workfare conditionality, responsibilization and a 
pressure to compete. This brings about an even stricter regulation that works by imposing a 
productivist morality (Mladenov, 2015a) of self-maximization on the individual applicant, 
eroding at that the possibility for collective identification and action. This way of governing 
through subjectification is characteristic of contemporary neoliberal regimes (Lazzarato, 
2012; Peters, 2001) that seek to retrench the welfare state and render welfare recipients as 
‘free consumers’ while maintaining a disciplined, compliant and productive workforce. The 
specific techniques of such a mode of government gain in strength by remaining black-boxed 
and, accordingly, lose strength when highlighted and unpacked. 
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Table 1: Distribution of assistance hours in Annex 1.15 
 
Category Maximum 
assistance hours 
Share of total 
assistance hours 
Everyday care 
1. Help with feeding, intake of liquids 25 8.3 % 
2. Help with the preparation of food 20 6.6 % 
3. Help with shopping – provision of necessary goods 20 6.6 % 
4. Help with maintaining personal hygiene 40 13.3 % 
5. Help with maintaining hygiene in the inhabited premises  10 3.3 % 
6. Help with the intake of medication, therapeutic 
manipulations 
10 3.3 % 
7. Help with visiting a physician, therapeutic procedures 
(hemodialysis, chemotherapy, etc.), hospitalization 
25 8.3 % 
Social activity and other activities for active social inclusion 
1. Accompanying to the workplace and back, and assistance 
with labour activity 
50 16.7 % 
2. Accompanying to the educational facility / organization 
for professional qualification and back, and assistance during 
the educational process 
50 16.7 % 
3. Other activities for: 
 improving one’s health and psycho-emotional 
condition; 
 personal improvement, activities at home and outside 
(participation in contests, competitions, choruses, 
exhibitions, sports events and similar activities – to 
be described), volunteering, caring for one’s minor 
child or adopted child  
50 16.7 % 
Total 300 100 % 
 
